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Abstract 
In the period following the Great Recession of 2007-9 the financialisation of the 
US economy reached a watershed characterised by stagnant financial profits, 
falling proportions of financial sector and mortgage debt, and rising proportion 
of public debt. The main macroeconomic indicators of financialisation in the 
USA show structural breaks that can be dated around the period of the Great 
Recession. The reliance of households on the formal financial system appears 
to have weakened for the first time since the early 1980s. The financial sector 
has lacked the dynamism of the previous three decades becoming more reliant 
on government. The state has increased its own indebtedness and supported 
large financial institutions via unconventional monetary policy measures. At the 
same time, state intervention has tightened the regulatory framework for big 
banks. The future path of financialisation in the USA will depend heavily on 
government policy with regard to state debt and financial regulation, although 
the scope for boosting financialisation is narrow. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial sector in the USA has tended to expand in the post-war era, 
despite numerous economic crises. The march of finance seemed relentless 
during the last four decades, giving rise to the concept of financialisation. The 
implications of this development for the economy and for wage workers have 
been pronounced in terms of value extraction, indebtedness and the 
unprecedented penetration of finance into personal and household life. 
However, the period following the Great Recession of 2007-9 has been 
distinctly different in the USA. For one thing, economic growth has been weak. 
For another, the financial sector has recovered from the shock of the crisis, but 
its performance in terms of trading, lending and profits has also been weak 
compared to other periods of recovery in the last four decades. Furthermore, 
the exposure of households to formal finance has not advanced with nearly 
similar vigour.  
Three aspects of the economic performance of the USA stand out in this 
regard. First, financial profits, as shown by several indicators, have not resumed 
their upward trend since the crisis. US banks have operated in an environment 
of sustained pressures on profitability during the last decade. Second, the 
volume of mortgage debt relative to disposable personal income has declined 
substantially for the first time since the 1980s, a development with potentially 
significant implications for the financial system. Third, the US government has 
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provided support to financial institutions by lowering nominal interest rates in 
the vicinity of zero and implementing unconventional policy measures, while 
supplying abundant liquidity to banks. The outcome has been a substantial 
expansion of state indebtedness which has roughly cancelled out the decline in 
household indebtedness. At the same time, the US state has constrained the 
activities of financial institutions through new regulations.  
Taken together, these developments point to a halt in the march of 
financialisation in the USA. On the evidence available so far, financialisation 
has reached a watershed and its future path will depend on government 
policies. It is conceivable that, if financial deregulation received a new boost, a 
fresh acceleration of financialisation could occur, in view especially of the 
expansion of state debt since 2007-9. However, a very different possibility is 
also open. The US economy is likely to remain financialised, and the ability of 
the financial system to generate bubbles and financial crises will continue to 
mark its performance, but the high point of financialisation might be behind us.   
The rest of this paper comprises four sections. Section 2 reviews 
relevant bodies of work that emphasise different aspects of financialised 
capitalism. Section 3 examines the watershed in the financialisation of the US 
economy after the great crisis of 2007-9 at the macroeconomic level by 
presenting data on the evolution of financial profits, indebtedness and the 
composition of aggregate debt. We corroborate the presence of statistically 
significant structural changes around the period of the Great Recession in the 
main indicators and discuss the results obtained. In light of this evidence, 
Section 4 explores some relevant theoretical issues with regard to the 
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relationship between households and finance, followed by conclusions in 
Section 5.  
 
2. Main approaches to financialisation 
Financialisation in the USA emerged in a fairly modest way at the end of the 
1970s as the financial sector began to grow relative to the rest of the economy. 
Since the early 1980s the balance between the financial sector and the rest of 
the economy has shifted strongly in favour of the former, and with considerable 
vigour in the 1990s and 2000s. This is the context in which the concept of 
financialisation has emerged in social sciences. 
The literature on financialisation is large and continually expanding. 
Using van der Zwan’s (2014) literature survey it is possible to identify three 
bodies of work that emphasise, respectively, the emergence of a new period of 
accumulation, the ascendancy of shareholder value, and the financialisation of 
everyday life. Although informed by different theories of capitalism, these 
approaches share a common concern for financialisation as a structural 
transformation of contemporary capitalism.  
The accumulation approach has been developed by a broad group of 
scholars –French Regulationists, Marxist and Post-Keynesian economists, 
economic sociologists and critical international political economists– who have 
emphasised the systemic aspects of financialisation as a distinct historical 
phase in the development of capitalism. Krippner (2005, p. 174) pointed out 
that financialisation represents “a pattern of accumulation in which profits 
accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and 
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commodity production”. The study of financial profits also played a fundamental 
role in the Marxist approach developed by Lapavitsas (2009, 2011, 2013), who 
argued that the extraction of profits in financial markets and from households 
includes a “direct” component in a financialised economy in contrast to the 
“indirect” extraction of surplus value in production. This feature of profit 
extraction has been termed “financial expropriation” and is explained in more 
detail at the end of this section.2   
Important in this respect is the “dual movement” of non-financial 
corporations that have increasingly derived profits from financial activities while 
at the same time augmenting their payments to the financial sector as interest, 
dividends, and share-buy-outs (Crotty, 2005). This “dual movement” has 
created a constraint for non-financial corporations by limiting capital available 
for productive investment despite the increase in profits from financial activities. 
Financialisation has thus contributed to a slowdown of accumulation since 
investment in tangible assets has suffered. It is important to note, however, that 
empirical evidence at the firm-level suggests that there have been variations 
according to firm size (Orhangazi, 2008). The interplay between “real” and 
“financial” processes with regard to investment is, thus, complex and 
contradictory (Orhangazi, 2011; Lapavitsas, 2013). 
In this regard, some scholars have emphasised the role of “the rentier” 
at the centre of an inherently unstable financial system (Epstein and Jayadev, 
2005). The rising profits of the owners of loanable capital and of financial 
institutions have been the counterpart to weak investment, stagnant real wages 
and increased indebtedness by households. The presence of the rentier 
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combined with high debt levels and low economic growth has increased the 
instability of the economy.3 
The literature on financialisation as a period of accumulation has also 
emphasised the importance of government policies toward finance. Thus, 
Krippner (2012) and Lapavitsas (2013) argue that the US state has buttressed 
the ascendancy of finance through a sustained policy of financial deregulation, 
the first intimations of which could be observed already in the second half of the 
1960s. The US state has also been pivotal in dealing with the successive crises 
that have emerged in the course of financialisation, above all, with the great 
crisis of 2007-9. The ability of the state to intervene in the sphere of finance has 
depended crucially on its monopoly control over the final means of payment. 
Further light on financialisation has been cast by the literature on the rise 
of shareholder value as characteristic feature of the modern corporation, 
especially in the USA. Shareholder value has become, first, a practical norm 
that provides justification for practices favouring shareholders over other 
constituents of the enterprise and, second, an ideological construct that 
legitimates a far-reaching redistribution of wealth and power among 
shareholders, managers and workers, at the expense of workers.  
The seminal paper by Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) pointed out that 
financialisation has fostered widespread belief in the economic benefits of 
maximising shareholder value as the principle of corporate governance. The 
implications for the internal structure of corporations have been drastic, as 
shown in further detail by recent economic sociology. Thompson (2003; 2013) 
has emphasised that financialisation has worsened the condition of labour at 
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work, as employers have not kept their side of the employment bargain. The 
ideology of shareholder value was stressed by Clark (2009) in explaining the 
further destabilisation of labour relations through exposure to capital markets. 
Daguerre (2014) has noted that financialisation has weakened labour by 
making employment more insecure, so that the end of the full-employment 
compact is a consequence of the rise of financialisation. More recently, Cushen 
and Thompson (2016) have returned to the ideology of shareholder value and 
have explicitly considered the intensification of value extraction from labour as 
corporations have become financialised. 
Finally, the literature on the financialisation of the everyday life has 
emphasised the diverse ways in which finance has spread across society 
through a range of projects and schemes aimed at incorporating low-income 
and middle-class households in financial markets –the “popular finance” 
described by Aitken (2007). This process has several complex aspects, 
including increased household participation in pension plans (Waine, 2006), the 
spread of consumer credit (Montgomerie, 2006) and the rise of home 
mortgages (Langley, 2008; Aalbers, 2008, 2015; Fernandez and Aalbers, 
2016). By participating in financial markets, households and wage-earners 
have been encouraged to internalise new norms of risk-taking, increasingly 
shifting toward financial markets for the provision of basic needs.  
The analysis in this paper draws on the Marxist approach developed by 
Lapavitsas (2013), which treats financialisation as a distinctive period in the 
development of capitalism lasting broadly four decades and characterised by 
the following three tendencies. First, large non-financial (productive) 
enterprises have less need to borrow from financial intermediaries since they 
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command substantial amounts of liquid money capital, which they often deploy 
in financial transactions. This means that financialisation has been marked by 
the relative detachment of industrial capitalists from banks. Second, financial 
intermediaries are less engaged in supporting investment by non-financial 
enterprises, turning instead toward trading in financial markets and transacting 
directly with households. Thus, financialisation is also marked by the turn of 
banks toward profiting from transactions in financial markets rather than lending 
to productive enterprises. Finally, households and individual workers have been 
drawn heavily into the formal financial system both to borrow and to place 
available saving. Therefore, the increasing implication of wage-workers and 
other social strata in the operations of the financial system to provide further 
opportunities for profit extraction is another defining feature of financialisation. 
 In this light, the trajectory of financialisation in the USA since the 
outbreak of the Great Recession is examined in this paper by focusing on a few 
specific economic magnitudes. First, and of paramount importance is financial 
profit, since its extraction and accumulation effectively sums up the conduct of 
capitalists (industrial and finance-focused) that drive financialisation. The 
tremendous growth of financial profit has marked the ascendancy of 
financialisation. By this token, the broad direction of financialisation in the USA 
since the Great Recession can be usefully surmised from the trajectory of 
financial profit. 
Equally important are the fluctuations of aggregate debt in its various 
forms. Financialisation amounts to the expansion of the financial sector relative 
to the productive sector, typically resulting in greater debt creation. The 
financialisation of capitalism has been undoubtedly marked by the growth of 
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aggregate debt as well as by a shifting balance in its composition. On these 
grounds, insight into the direction of development of financialisation in the USA 
since the Great Recession could be gained by considering the overall trajectory 
and the changing composition of aggregate debt.  
Finally, financialisation as a historical period has occurred within a social 
and political framework of laws, rules and policies by the state, and therefore 
its content can be expected to vary from country to country. In examining its 
trajectory, it is vital to take the social and political framework into account, while 
being aware that there could be little generalisation in this respect. For our 
purposes, the point is to outline the broad confines of state policy toward 
finance, thus casting further light on the development of financialisation in the 
USA since the Great Recession.  
 
3. Financialisation in the USA since the Great Recession 
The crisis of 2007-9 can be considered as the culmination of tendencies 
characteristic of the period of financialisation (Lapavitsas, 2013). The crisis 
originally broke out in the US financial system following a huge real estate 
bubble in the 2000s; the immediate trigger was the inability of the poorest layers 
of the US working class to meet mortgage debt obligations accumulated during 
the bubble; it spread to other financial systems as the international money 
market froze for lack of liquidity; and it became a global recession as trade and 
investment were affected by the collapse of credit. The crisis was subsequently 
dealt with through large-scale intervention by the US state, mainly by providing 
liquidity to banks through the Federal Reserve that has monopoly control over 
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the final means of payment, but also through the injection of capital in banks 
out of tax income. 
To assess the evolution of financialisation in the USA since the crisis we 
present indicators from two fields. These are, first, the profits (or income share) 
of the financial sector and its main determinants; and, second, the accumulated 
debt of households, the financial sector and the non-financial corporate sector.4 
The empirical analysis focuses on testing for the presence of structural changes 
in the main indicators that can be dated approximately around the period of the 
Great Recession. To that effect we deployed the algorithm for simultaneous 
estimation of multiple breakpoints occurring at unknown dates developed by 
Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) and calculated the corresponding confidence 
intervals associated with the breakpoints following Zeileis and Kleiber (2005).  
The procedures were implemented using a univariate regression model 
for each series, including a constant (a0) and a linear deterministic trend (t): yt 
= a0 + a1(t) + ut, where yt is the series under consideration, a1 is the coefficient 
on the linear trend, and ut is the error term.5 In all cases we tested for structural 
breaks both in the mean and trend of the series and accounted for potential 
serial correlation via non-parametric adjustments.6 We also allowed up to five 
breaks, used a trimming percentage of 15%, and made provision for error 
distribution heterogeneity across breaks. 
The main results are presented in Table 1 below. All the selected 
indicators of financialisation present structural breaks around 2007-9 when the 
confidence intervals at the 95% confidence level are considered, the only 
exception being the two series that depict non-interest income (both shown in 
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Figure 3). We interpret the presence of structural breaks estimated around the 
period of the Great Recession in the mean and trend of the series as evidence 
of a relative halt of financialisation: the period before the Great Recession was 
characterised mainly by rising financial profits, rising debt of the financial sector, 
and rising household and mortgage debt; in contrast, the period since the Great 
Recession has been characterised by stagnant financial profits, falling debt of 
the financial sector, and falling household and mortgage debt.7   
 
3.1. Stagnant financial profits 
Figure 1 presents the trajectory of financial profits, that is, the profits of financial 
institutions relative to GDP, for the entire period after the Second World War.8   
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Financial profits in the US economy declined in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the time of the “Volcker Shock”, which led to turmoil in the financial 
system.9 After 2006 financial profits declined sharply, until collapsing in the 
course of the crisis 2007-9. In 2009 financial profits bounced back but have 
never attained the rising trend relative to GDP characteristic of the two decades 
following the Volcker Shock. As shown in Table 1, there is a statistically 
significant structural break in the financial profits series around 2004Q3–
2017Q1.10 
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[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
To explain the historic trajectory of financial profits, two fundamental 
variables have been identified on the basis of previous work by Lapavitsas and 
Mendieta-Muñoz (2017). First is the Net Interest Margin (NIM), i.e., the 
difference between interest received and interest paid out by banks relative to 
their total interest-earning assets. Second is the non-interest income (NII), i.e., 
income deriving mostly from fees, commissions and proprietary trading. The 
empirical analysis shows that the former is the most important explanatory 
factor with regard to aggregate financial profits.   
Figure 2 shows the NIM for all US banks. It is notable that the NIM has 
been in steady decline since the early 1990s, reaching very low levels as the 
crisis of 2007-9 broke out. It bounced back strongly toward the end of the crisis 
as the borrowing rates of US banks were sharply reduced following government 
intervention, but has subsequently resumed its steady decline. As shown in 
Table 1, the NIM series presents a structural break around 2007Q3–2009Q4. 
In an environment of extremely low interest rates that has lasted for several 
years after the crisis, US banks appear to have faced difficulties in increasing 
the interest rate differential on their assets and liabilities to boost their 
profitability. The fall in NIM has affected negatively bank profitability.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
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US banks have also faced difficulties in generating profits from NII since 
the Great Recession. These forms of bank income have been important to 
financialisation, reflecting the deep transformation of banks during the last four 
decades. Note that the NIM has been declining since 1994; however, financial 
profits were very high until 2007. This reflects the importance of NII during this 
period. Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 3, in the conditions that have emerged 
since the Great Recession, the NII of US commercial banks has declined both 
as a percentage of total bank assets and as percentage of non-financial 
corporate profits.11      
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The turn of the mortgage market in 2007 also seems to have signalled 
the end of a period of sustained increases in NII for US banks. To be more 
precise, in the years preceding the Great Recession, the ability of banks to 
extract non-interest profits was closely linked to the real estate bubble and to 
securitising and trading mortgage debt. In the aftermath of the Great Recession 
US banks have found it difficult to restore NII to a rising path. The structural 
break tests for the NII series shown in Figure 1, however, detect the breakpoints 
before 2007, indicating that the downward trend of the NII component started 
before the Great Recession. 
The difficulties that US financial institutions have faced with regard to 
profits since the Great Recession are also apparent in two alternative measures 
of financial profitability, i.e., the return on assets (ROA) and the return on equity 
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(ROE), both presented in Figure 4 below. Data availability does not allow for 
accurate calculation prior to the 1980s. Nonetheless, it is clear that from the 
early 1990s to the mid-2000s the profitability of financial institutions was 
exceptionally high. The crisis brought a collapse of profitability, which bounced 
back in the early 2010s, but has never attained the previous levels. The era of 
exceptional financial profits characteristic of the 1990s and 2000s came to an 
end after the Great Recession, which is corroborated by the statistically 
significant breakpoints presented in Table 1 detected for both the ROA and 
ROE around 2009Q3–2010Q2.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In sum, the rising trajectory of financial profits in the US economy 
appears to have come to a halt after the Great Recession. In the course of the 
four decades prior to the crisis of 2007-9 financial profits escalated as banks 
took advantage of the margin between interest received and interest paid, while 
also drawing fees, commissions and proprietary profits from transacting in 
financial markets and from dealing with households. The inability of financial 
profits to resume a rising trend since the Great Recession of 2007-9 is a sign 
that financialisation has reached a watershed in the US economy.     
 
3.2. Aggregate debt and its changing composition  
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Turning to indebtedness, Figure 5 shows the proportion of debt relative to GDP 
for the non-financial and the financial sectors of the US economy since 1955. 
The period of financialisation has witnessed rapid growth of all debt but 
particularly that of the financial sector, i.e., debt created by financial institutions 
as they transact with each other and as they borrow and lend to the non-
financial sector. It is clear that financial debt has declined substantially post-
2009, while the debt of the non-financial sector has remained broadly stable. 
Indeed, as shown in Table 1, it is possible to detect breakpoints in both series 
around 2007Q1–2007Q4. The contraction of aggregate financial debt is 
consistent with banks having fewer opportunities to generate non-interest 
profits out of financial transactions. In part it is also probably related to the 
regulatory measures taken after the crisis to restrict the ability of large banks to 
engage in proprietary trading of financial assets (briefly discussed below). It is 
prima facie evidence of a relative halt of financialisation in the USA.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
  
Even more important, however, is the dramatic change in the 
composition of non-financial debt. Figure 6 splits non-financial debt into its main 
components: household, non-financial business and government debt.  
It is immediately apparent that household debt has declined significantly 
as a proportion of GDP for the first time since the early 1980s.12 Rising 
household debt has been an important source of financial profits in the decades 
of the ascendancy of financialisation. Its decline for the first time –as shown 
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below, associated almost exclusively with a fall in mortgage debt– indicates that 
the penetration of finance into household life in the USA has been attenuated 
after the Great Recession. As shown in Table 1, the presence of a structural 
break around 2007Q2–2007Q4 for the household debt series can be 
corroborated statistically. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
At the same time, the debt of the US non-financial business sector, i.e., 
of the core agents of capitalist accumulation, fell after the crisis and, although 
it has recovered in the ensuing period, it has not registered a significant 
increase. Its trajectory indicates that productive US enterprises have been 
relatively detached from the financial system since the Great Recession. Again, 
the presence of a breakpoint in this series can be detected statistically around 
2004Q1–2008Q1 using the endogenous structural break tests presented in 
Table 1.  
During the same period, government debt has risen substantially, thus 
entirely counterbalancing the fall in household debt. From Table 1 it is possible 
to observe that a statistically significant structural break occurred in the 
government debt series around 2005Q1–2007Q3. Rising US government debt 
since 2007 is inextricably linked to state intervention to deal with the crisis and 
its aftermath. One of the most important aspects of government policy was to 
lower public interest rates. The federal funds rate of the Federal Reserve was 
driven close to zero, which means that, in real terms (i.e., subtracting the rate 
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of inflation), the federal funds rate has actually been negative for the entire 
period since 2009. The increase in US government debt is thus the counterpart 
of near-zero interest rates.  
The indispensable role of public debt in sustaining the US economy after 
the crisis has been stressed by Hager (2016). His work emphasises that the 
global financial system was rescued from the brink of collapse by the explosive 
rise in public indebtedness, so that the actions taken by the US government 
provided vital support to financialisation. Consequently, domestic ownership of 
public debt has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of wealthy 
households and large corporations during the last 35 years, especially in the 
period since the crisis. Growing concentration of ownership in US public debt 
has also reinforced unequal power relations in society. 
Additionally, confronted with the zero lower bound for nominal interest 
rates and having exhausted the traditional tools of monetary policy, the Fed 
resorted to unconventional policy measures. It purchased large amounts of 
securities in what became known as “quantitative easing” or “large scale asset 
purchase program” in order to lower yields on longer-term assets in the hope 
of accelerating economic recovery. However, as Montecino and Epstein (2015) 
mention, another plausible reason behind the implementation of such monetary 
policies could be that the Fed attempted to help its main constituency, the large 
banks, faced with the fall-out from the financial crisis. Their results show that 
banks which sold mortgage-backed securities to the Fed experienced 
economically and statistically significant increases in profitability (measured by 
the return on assets). Moreover, they also find evidence of indirect spillover 
effects on bank profits: “exposure” banks (banks with large holdings of 
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mortgage-backed securities relative to total assets prior to the Great 
Recession) experienced significant increases in profitability relative to “non-
exposure” banks. This means that banks able to sell mortgage-backed 
securities in the course of quantitative easing obtained further economic 
benefits in addition to the benefits experienced by the financial sector as a 
whole.   
At the same time, however, the US state has changed the regulatory 
environment through the Dodd-Frank Act, making it harder for large deposit-
taking banks to engage in financial trading.13 Without dramatically altering the 
regulatory framework of financialisation, the Dodd-Frank Act passed into law in 
2010 has aimed at reducing speculative risk-taking by large banks. It has also 
aimed at creating a framework that would allow large banks to fail without 
presumably endangering the financial system, and thus requiring rescue from 
public funds. In addition, the so-called “Volcker Rule”, included in the Act and 
operational since 2013, has prohibited banks from engaging in proprietary 
trading on their own account, while severely limiting bank ownership of hedge 
funds or private equity funds. To strengthen the prudential aspect of the Act, 
furthermore, the US central bank has been given greater supervisory powers 
over capital, liquidity and leverage of large banks. The Dodd-Frank legislation 
has affected the ability of banks to extract non-interest income by engaging in 
market transactions.  
The final piece of evidence relates to the composition of declining US 
household debt. Figure 7 tracks the composition of this debt in terms of 
mortgage and consumer debt relative to disposable personal income. It shows 
a significant relative decline in mortgage debt since the crisis. At the same time, 
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consumer debt registered a dip relative to disposable income at the time of the 
crisis, and has returned to a mildly upward trend since then. The structural 
breaks for each series are detected around 2007Q1–2007Q3 and 2005Q3–
2007Q3, respectively. Note that mortgage debt is by far the decisive component 
of household debt. On these grounds, household and worker income has lost 
some of its importance as a source of potential profit –in terms of both interest 
and non-interest income– for US financial institutions since 2007. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The deleveraging of US households has been well documented by 
recent work. Jian and Sánchez (2016) show that the deleveraging may have 
been caused by the declining willingness of households to borrow (operating 
on the side of credit demand) instead of a tightening of borrowing constraints 
(operating on the side of credit supply). Garriga et al. (2017) stress the 
substantial changes in debt composition that have taken place. Prior to the 
Great Recession, there were large run-ups in the average debt per borrower 
for both student debt and mortgage debt; after the crisis mortgage debt has 
decreased but student debt has continued to grow. Focusing on the decline in 
mortgage debt, Bhutta (2012) finds that the drop in mortgage debt has to do 
more with shrinking inflows (which come from borrowers who increase their 
mortgage debt during a given two-year window) than with expanding outflows 
(which come from borrowers who decrease their mortgage debt during that 
window), including defaults.14 
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4. Further aspects of households, housing and finance in the USA since 
the Great Recession 
Crises can be turning points in capitalist development. The discussion and 
evidence on key macroeconomic indicators for the USA point to a watershed 
for, or even a relative halt of, financialisation during the period following the 
Great Recession of 2007-9. On the one hand, the debt of non-financial 
enterprises indicates a continuing relative detachment from banks supported 
by access to own funds. On the other, US households have substantially 
lowered their exposure to the formal financial system, which is reflected mainly 
by the decline in mortgage debt. The formal financial system, meanwhile, has 
reduced debt created among financial enterprises. These developments have 
had a substantial impact on banks, contributing to a relative decline in financial 
profit.  
The policies of the US government during this period have had additional 
and complex effects on financialisation. The dramatic reduction in the Fed funds 
interest rate, the quantitative easing policy, and the abundant provision of 
liquidity by the state allowed banks to deal with the shock of the crisis of 2007-
9. However, liquidity provision over several years has raised state indebtedness 
to levels that are extraordinary for the post-war period. Moreover, regulatory 
intervention by the US government has lessened the scope for purely 
speculative bank activity, thus further constraining the profits of banks. Thus, 
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financialisation in the USA since the Great Recession has carried a strong and 
complex imprint by the state, both supporting and inhibiting its development.  
Nevertheless, the reduced exposure of US households to mortgage debt 
in relative terms is perhaps the most striking change in the components of 
aggregate private debt during the last decade. Housing and mortgage credit 
have been of paramount importance during the period of financialisation in the 
USA and elsewhere, not least by providing new sources of financial profit.15 
Therefore, assessing the significance of the decline in mortgage debt in the 
USA ought to depart from the peculiar character of household debt.  
Bank lending involves the advance of value in the money form against a 
promise of repayment with interest. Borrower and lender engage in complex 
relations that rest on the borrower’s ability to generate funds to make 
repayments, and on the lender’s ability to impose conditions ensuring 
repayments. The relationship between banks and non-financial enterprises as, 
respectively, lenders and borrowers is driven by the innate logic of capital 
accumulation and profit making for both parties. Thus, the decisions to borrow, 
lend, and engage in financial transactions would be based on the search for 
profits; and their relationship as lenders and borrowers would be shaped by 
comparable expertise, information and motivation in extracting monetary 
profits.  
In contrast, the relationship between financial institutions and 
households and wage workers is qualitatively different. Households and wage 
workers are driven by the logic of obtaining the means of subsistence –or 
fulfilling consumption needs, while for financial institutions the logic remains that 
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of profit making. Their relationship represents a clash of qualitatively different 
principles, and an unequal balance of information and power. Debt could allow 
households to fulfil consumption needs in excess of the value of current 
earnings and possible savings. At the same time, debt could also place 
households and wage workers in a systematically disadvantageous position 
due to the unequal relationship with lenders. Repayments on household debt 
are generally made out of future income earnings, and represent an 
appropriation of value, thus providing a foundation for financial expropriation of 
households and wage workers. 
The decision by households to increase or decrease their debt cannot 
be explained by relying exclusively on economic criteria that refer to the 
maximisation of returns. The development of consumption needs, norms, 
habits, and expectations takes place also through complex non-economic 
processes. Consequently, financial decisions by households can also be 
modified by the interaction between social norms, cultural trends, and 
institutional changes. Both the volume of household debt and the flow of service 
payments on such debt will also depend on the concrete evolution of non-
economic factors.  
In this light, it would be misleading to assume that US households from 
the early 1980s to the late 2000s became heavily indebted simply because 
wages, salaries and other forms of income were “insufficient” for the purposes 
of obtaining the means of subsistence. Goldstein (2013) has provided evidence 
that the patterns of the ratio of debt to income in the USA for the period 1988-
2007 are less consistent with an explanation based on an income squeeze and 
more consistent with the spread of a culture of reliance on finance. The growth 
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of debt to income was concentrated disproportionately among college-
educated, upper-middle income households, rather than the lower-middle class 
households which felt the effects of the income squeeze most acutely. As 
discussed in Section 2, finance has come to pervade the lives of US households 
in far more complex ways, which have to do with the balance between the public 
and private provision of key goods and services as well as changes in the norms 
of consumption.  
In accounting for the composition of household debt, therefore, 
reference ought to be made to the different systems of housing provision that 
reflect historical, institutional and even cultural aspects of housing 
expenditure.16 The paper by Fernandez and Aalbers (2016) is of relevance in 
this respect, referring, on the one hand, to the rise of housing finance as an 
integral part of macroeconomic policy and, on the other, to the role of financial 
globalization in the rise of housing finance. According to them, under 
financialised capitalism, there is a “wall of money” –given the growing 
imbalance between the growth rate of the stock of capital and GDP– looking for 
profitable investment. This wall of money fuels a variety of traditional and 
“innovative” financial instruments that could perhaps better be characterized as 
a “financial fix”: an emergent financial landscape in a permanent state of stable 
instability that enables a continuous circulation of capital outside the sphere of 
production.  
In this light, the structural break in mortgage debt in the USA is a 
development of considerable importance for it indicates that a vital element of 
financialisation with regard to labour and households has been weakened by 
the Great Recession. What is beyond dispute is that the large decline of 
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household debt relative to GDP and of mortgage debt relative to disposable 
personal income is unprecedented since the early 1980s. From a longer-term 
perspective it would appear that the tremendous growth of mortgage finance in 
the 2000s was an exception in the post-war years propelling financialisation 
forward but coming to an end after the crisis.   
Equally complex factors have contributed to the rise of consumer debt 
among US households. The exposure of labour to financialisation is far more 
complex than the simple syllogism “insufficient wages lead to higher debt”. The 
trajectory of consumer debt reflects the existence of secure employment (or 
lack thereof), the degree of unionisation and, more particularly, the type of 
access to consumer credit, i.e., personal loans, credit cards, and so on. The 
literature on consumer debt indicates that changes in the level of personal or 
household indebtedness are related to the easy availability of credit and to the 
broader social dimensions of consumer behaviour, which can influence the 
preferences of individuals through the media and otherwise. Barba and Pivetti 
(2009) and Cynamon and Fazzari (2010), for example, emphasise, first, the 
growth of indebtedness as a result of the continuous people’s desire to improve 
their individual material well-being –which includes imitation of the upper 
classes; and, second, how social institutions create preferences and 
expectations over time, so that households and labour learn and repeat 
consumption patterns from their social reference groups –which could be 
constituted by neighbours, family, and friends, but they could also be virtual, 
arising from behavioral models portrayed by the media.    
The structural breaks in consumer debt and mortgage indebtedness by 
US households at the time of the Great Recession are, therefore, developments 
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of significance. The reliance of US labour on credit for consumption purposes 
seems to have resumed a rising trend after the crisis in view of stagnating 
wages and salaries, but also given the prevalent norms of borrowing for 
consumption. In sharp contrast, the links of US labour to the formal financial 
system have significantly weakened with regard to mortgages, i.e. the most 
important element of household credit. Judging by this differential performance, 
it is possible that the norms and practices of housing in the USA have changed 
since the Great Recession, perhaps in view of the costs that the collapse of the 
housing bubble entailed for US households. Be that as it may, there is no doubt 
that at the aggregate level a historic retrenchment has taken place with regard 
to mortgage debt, constituting a new development for the USA in the post-war 
years.17  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The path of the main indicators of financialisation in the USA at the aggregate 
level since the Great Recession bring to mind Crotty’s (2008, p. 182) comment 
on the eve of the Great Recession: “I find it hard to believe that financial markets 
can continue to grow forever at the rapid pace of the current era, or that giant 
firms piling up unprecedented if hidden risk will never suffer the consequences. 
No one knows what dangers are hidden off their balance sheets, or in obscure 
footnotes in incomprehensible financial reports, or in the massive leverage they 
have created. The current Golden Age of finance may end with a whimper, or 
… it could go out with a bang. But at some point not knowable today, it will end.”  
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There is good reason to think that Crotty was right about the likely end 
of the “Golden Age of finance”. The period since the end of the Great Recession 
has certainly not been a “Golden Age” judging by the most important indicator, 
i.e., financial profits. Moreover, aggregate private debt has declined, and the 
drop has been particularly notable for mortgage debt. In contrast, the 
accumulation of government debt has greatly expanded, as the government 
has supported the financial system by providing liquidity and implementing 
unconventional monetary policies. Financialisation has acquired a stronger 
public dimension and financial institutions have come to rely more heavily on 
the state; but the regulatory financial policies implemented also seem to have 
affected negatively the evolution of financial profits.  
This is not to imply, however, that the US financial system is no longer 
prone to bubbles and instability. The US economy remains complexly 
financialised, and easy access to liquidity provided by the state has boosted 
financial asset prices, as a mere glance at the Stock Market in 2017-8 would 
indicate. However, the stagnation of financial profits, the decline in mortgage 
debt and the drop in financial debt, which have been counterbalanced by the 
rise in public debt, indicate a relative weakening of financialisation in the years 
since the Great Recession.   
The future path of financialisation in the USA is likely to depend critically 
on government policies. It is conceivable that the US government will once 
again loosen the constraints on financial activity, thus giving a fresh boost to 
financialisation. Yet, the US government remains constrained by the enormous 
burden of public debt accumulated as a result of the crisis of 2007-9. Moreover, 
it is not in the state’s gift rapidly to increase mortgage debt, and it would be 
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utterly reckless to seek to intensify once again the reliance of labour on the 
formal financial system with regard to mortgages. Furthermore, the Federal 
Reserve has recently started to raise interest rates in a sustained fashion, even 
if the risks are manifest in view of rising consumer debt and the tremendous 
increase in government debt. In sum, although the future trajectory of 
financialisation is likely to depend on government policies, the scope for 
boosting financialisation is narrow. A financialised economy characterised by 
stagnant financial profits that continues to drift in the long run is also a latent 
possibility. 
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Figure 1. USA, 1948Q1-2017Q2 (quarterly data). Financial profits as 
percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data obtained from the National Income and 
Product Accounts (NIPA) and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). 
[Financial profits: NIPA, Table 6.16. Corporate Profits by Industry; Nominal 
GDP: FRED, GDP series]. Shaded areas indicate periods of U.S. recession 
as determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
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Figure 2. USA, 1984Q1-2017Q2 (quarterly data). Net interest margin for all 
banks, in percentage  
 
Source: Data obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). 
[Series: USNIM]. Shaded areas indicate periods of U.S. recession as 
determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
  
36 
 
Figure 3. USA, 1948-2016 (annual data). Non-interest income for all 
commercial banks as percentage of non-financial corporate profits (straight 
line, left axis) and as percentage of total assets for all commercial banks 
(dotted line, right axis) 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data obtained from the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and from the National Income and Product 
Accounts (NIPA). [Non-interest income for commercial banks: FDIC, Table 
CB04. Net Income for all Insured Commercial Banks; Total assets for 
commercial banks: FDIC, Table CB09. Assets for all Insured Commercial 
Banks; Non-financial corporate profits: NIPA, Table 6.16. Corporate Profits by 
Industry]. 
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Figure 4. USA, 1984Q1-2017Q2 (quarterly data). Return on average assets 
(straight line, left axis) and return on average equity (dotted line, right axis) for 
all banks 
 
Source: Data retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). 
[Return on average assets: FRED, USROA series; Return on average equity: 
FRED, USROE series]. Shaded areas indicate periods of U.S. recession as 
determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
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Figure 5. USA, 1951Q4-2017Q2 (quarterly data). Financial sector debt as 
percentage of GDP (straight line) and non-financial sector debt as percentage 
of GDP (dotted line) 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data obtained from the Federal Reserve Board 
of Governors (FRB) and from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). 
[Financial sector debt: FRB, Table D.3. Debt Outstanding by Sector, 
LA794104005 series; Non-financial sector debt: FRB, Table D.3. Debt 
Outstanding by Sector, LA384104005 series; Nominal GDP: FRED, GDP 
series]. Shaded areas indicate periods of U.S. recession as determined by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
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Figure 6. USA, 1951Q4-2017Q2 (quarterly data). Non-financial sector debt: 
Households and non-profit organizations debt as percentage of GDP (straight 
line), non-financial business debt as percentage of GDP (dotted line), and 
federal, state and local governments debt as percentage of GDP (line with 
circles) 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data obtained from the Federal Reserve Board 
of Governors (FRB) and from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). 
[Households and non-profit organizations debt: FRB, Table D.3. Debt 
Outstanding by Sector, LA384104005 series; Non-financial business debt: 
FRB, Table D.3. Debt Outstanding by Sector, LA144104005 series; Federal, 
state and local governments: FRB, Table D.3. Debt Outstanding by Sector, 
LA314104005 + LA214104005 series; Nominal GDP: FRED, GDP series]. 
Shaded areas indicate periods of U.S. recession as determined by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
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Figure 7. USA, 1951Q4-2017Q2 (quarterly data). Households and non-profit 
organizations sector debt: Home mortgages as percentage of disposable 
personal income (straight line) and consumer credit as percentage of 
disposable personal income (dotted line) 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data obtained from the Federal Reserve Board 
of Governors (FRB) and from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). 
[Home mortgages: FRB, Table D.3. Debt Outstanding by Sector, 
LA153165105 series; Consumer credit: FRB, Table D.3. Debt Outstanding by 
Sector, LA153166000 series; Disposable personal income: FRED, DSPI 
series]. Shaded areas indicate periods of U.S. recession as determined by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
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Table 1. Endogenous structural break tests 
Variables Number of 
breaks 
selecteda 
Breakpoint datesb Corresponding 
confidence 
intervals at the 
95% levelc 
Financial profits as 
percentage of GDP 
(Figure 1)d 
3 1981Q1     
1993Q1 
2006Q2 
1970Q3 – 1981Q2 
1984Q2 – 2001Q1 
2004Q3 – 2017Q1 
Net interest margin 
(Figure 2)d 
2 1992Q1 
2009Q3 
1991Q4 – 1992Q3 
2007Q3 – 2009Q4 
Non-interest 
income as 
percentage of non-
financial corporate 
profits (Figure 3)d 
3 1976        
1993 
2003 
1975 – 1977    
1985 – 1994 
2002 – 2005 
Non-interest 
income as 
percentage of total 
assets (Figure 3)d 
2 1976 
1998 
1975 – 1977 
1997 – 1999 
Return on assets 
(Figure 4)d 
3 1991Q4 
2004Q4 
2009Q4 
1991Q3 – 1996Q1 
2003Q4 – 2005Q1 
2009Q3 – 2010Q2 
Return on equity 
(Figure 4)d 
3 1991Q4 
2004Q4 
2009Q4 
1991Q3 – 1998Q2 
2003Q4 – 2005Q1 
2009Q3 – 2010Q2 
Financial sector 
debt as percentage 
of GDP (Figure 5)e 
4 1973Q3 
1986Q3 
1997Q4 
2007Q3 
–f 
1986Q2 – 1986Q4 
1996Q3 – 1998Q1 
2007Q2 – 2007Q4 
Non-financial 
sector debt as 
percentage of GDP 
(Figure 5)e 
5 1965Q2 
1977Q3 
1987Q2 
1997Q1 
2007Q3 
1965Q1 – 1967Q1 
1977Q1 – 1977Q4 
1987Q1 – 1988Q2 
1996Q4 – 1997Q2 
2007Q1 – 2007Q4 
Households and 
non-profit 
organizations debt 
as percentage of 
GDP (Figure 6)e 
5 1964Q3 
1975Q1 
1984Q4 
1997Q4 
2007Q3 
1964Q2 – 1964Q4 
1973Q4 – 1975Q2 
1984Q3 – 1985Q1 
1997Q3 – 1999Q1 
2007Q2 – 2007Q4 
Non-financial 
business debt as 
percentage of GDP 
(Figure 6)e 
4 1975Q4 
1985Q3  
1997Q4 
2007Q3 
1967Q4 – 1976Q2 
1985Q1 – 1985Q4 
–f 
2004Q1 – 2008Q1 
Federal, state and 
local governments 
debt as percentage 
of GDP (Figure 6)e 
4 1965Q2 
1981Q2 
1996Q1 
2007Q1 
1961Q4 – 1974Q4  
–f 
–f 
2005Q1 – 2007Q3  
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Table 1 (continuation). Endogenous structural break tests 
Variables Number of 
breaks 
selecteda 
Breakpoint datesb Corresponding 
confidence 
intervals at the 
95% levelc 
Home mortgages 
as percentage of 
disposable 
personal income 
(Figure 7)e 
5 1965Q2 
1975Q1 
1984Q4 
1995Q4 
2007Q2 
1964Q4 – 1965Q3 
1963Q2 – 1975Q2 
1984Q3 – 1985Q1 
1995Q3 – 1996Q1 
2007Q1 – 2007Q3 
Consumer credit 
as percentage of 
disposable 
personal income 
(Figure 7)e 
4 1963Q2 
1982Q3 
1992Q3 
2007Q2 
–f 
–f 
1992Q2 – 1992Q4 
2005Q3 – 2007Q3 
Notes: aBai and Perron’s (1998; 2003) algorithm, which estimates the optimal 
number of breakpoints by minimizing the residual sum of squares (RSS) of a 
regression model. The number of breakpoints were selected according to the 
Schwarz information criterion (BIC).  
bIndicate the last date of each regime. 
cA description of the distribution function used to estimate the confidence 
intervals for the breakpoints can be found in Zeileis and Kleiber (2005). 
dRegression model employed: yt = a0 + a1(t) + ut; where yt is the time-series 
under consideration, a0 is the intercept, t is a linear deterministic trend, a1 is 
the coefficient on the latter, and ut is the error term.     
eRegression model employed: yt = a0 + a1(t) + a2(t2) + ut; where yt is the time-
series under consideration, a0 is the intercept, t is a linear deterministic trend, 
a1 is the coefficient on the latter, t2 is a quadratic trend, a2 is the coefficient on 
the latter, and ut is the error term.  
fIt was not possible to estimate these confidence intervals using the Zeilis and 
Kleiber (2005)’s procedure.  
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ENDNOTES 
1We are grateful to the editors of the journal and two anonymous referees for comments on 
previous versions of this paper. All remaining errors are the authors’ responsibility. 
2The term was originally proposed by Lapavitsas (2009), and was developed further in 
Lapavitsas (2013). See also Dos Santos (2009). 
3For a more detailed discussion of similarities and differences among heterodox approaches 
see Orhangazi (2011). 
4Both empirical dimensions have also been emphasised as the main indicators of 
financialisation at the macroeconomic level by Krippner (2005) and Palley (2010).  
5Bai and Perron’s (1998; 2003) algorithm estimates the optimal number of breakpoints by 
minimizing the residual sum of squares (RSS) of a regression model. We also included a 
quadratic trend (t2) in the regression if the latter was found to be statistically significant at the 
1% level of significance (see notes d and e in Table 1 below). 
6In brief, we used a kernel heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimator 
with a quadratic spectral kernel, pre-whitening using a vector autoregressive model of order 1 
(VAR(1)) and an autoregressive of order 1 (AR(1)) approximation for the automatic bandwidth 
selection. See also Bai and Perron (2003) and Zeileis and Kleiber (2005).  
7It is worth stating that, ideally, the presence of structural breaks would need to be tested using 
a comprehensive framework connecting the effects of different types of debt (or leverage ratios) 
on financial profits. To the best of our knowledge, such a structural model has not yet been 
developed for financialisation.  
8Measuring financial profits is a difficult task both conceptually and empirically. For further 
analysis of the technical difficulties of measuring financial profits in the USA see Lapavitsas 
and Mendieta-Muñoz (2016).   
9The Volcker Shock was a decisive event in catalysing financialisation in the USA since it 
involved a dramatic increase in interest rates with the aim of lowering inflation. The rise in 
interest rates engineered by the Federal Reserve after Paul Volcker becoming Governor in 
1979, and the deep recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s substantially reduced financial 
profits. However, the lowering of inflation combined with deregulation of finance rebounded in 
favour of lenders and capitalists engaged in finance, ushering in a period of sustained growth 
of financial profits for about two decades. 
10The large confidence interval associated with this breakpoint date reflects the uncertainty of 
this period.   
11Following Lapavitsas and Mendieta-Muñoz (2017), we consider that NII represents a 
proportion of total profits in the economy. Thus, the correct way to study the evolution of NII is 
as a percentage of non-financial corporate profits. We also plotted NII as a percentage of total 
assets as a robustness check. 
12Note that the absolute levels of consumer and mortgage debt (trillions of US dollars) have 
been gently rising in recent years, and consumer debt has surpassed its earlier peak. However, 
the relevant variable for purposes of analysis is the relative level of debt, i.e., the level of debt 
with respect to GDP or disposable personal income. Essentially, these ratios reflect real 
indicators rather nominal indicators. There is no doubt that the relative levels of debt have not 
recovered to the pre-Great Recession heights. 
13The Dodd-Frank Act is a heroically long and complex piece of legislation, rising to 849 pages, 
the interpretation of which has generated a veritable army of lawyers and others employed by 
big banks. Not surprisingly, the academic literature on its impact has been very limited. The Act 
is available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf 
(accessed 28 December 2016).  
14Note that, as discussed by Kiyotaki et al. (2011), the availability of mortgage debt is a key 
factor in increasing house prices. The fall in mortgage debt since the crisis has affected 
negatively the evolution of real residential property prices. 
15The seminal paper by Aalbers (2008) emphasised the growing importance of mortgage debt 
in the composition of household debt in several developed countries. Aalbers (2015) 
subsequently pointed out that the start of the so-called “Great Moderation” in the economy in 
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the 1990s and 2000s was also the start of the financialisation of housing. What appeared to be 
a structural moderation of macroeconomic cycles was in fact the build-up of a bubble economy.  
16Aalbers and Christophers (2014) noted that the peculiar nature of housing has not received 
sufficient attention in the literature, even though there have been contributions in the literature 
on the “Varieties of Capitalism” examining different modes of provision of housing. One 
important exception is Schwarz and Seabrook (2009), who distinguish among modes of 
provision of housing by examining the relative weight of mortgage finance and the mix of home-
ownership and rental accommodation.   
17The sharpness of the reaction is reminiscent of the change in popular outlook toward debt in 
Japan after the burst of the great bubble of the 1980s, without implying that the path of 
household financialisation in the USA will be henceforth similar to Japan.  
